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carefully dealing with the lands granted by the State to the
levee boards under the provisions of the various acts making
such grants, so that they were not lightly to be considered as
revoked or repealed by the Legislature, '34 and, second, in the
light of such careful dealing, an intent to divest the board of
title was not to be lightly inferred particularly since "it would
have been a very simple matter for the Legislature to have used
appropriate language showing such intention. '35
III.

CIVIL CODE AND RELATED SUBJECTS
SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS

Harriet S. Daggett*
In a contest between a brother and sister, both seeking appointment as administrator of their mother's estate, the supreme
court in Succession of Brown1 upheld the trial judge's appointment of the brother, stating that the matter was largely in the
discretion of the judge unless abuse was shown. The rule that
the term "beneficiary heir" applies to heirs who may accept with
benefit of inventory, as well as to those who have thus accepted,
was reiterated. Article 1033 of the Revised Civil Code was said
to govern the presented situation.
The facts in Kiper v. Kiper2 showed that Mrs. Kiper, widow,
died, leaving four children and an interest in a piece of property
formerly belonging to the community between herself and her
deceased husband. Her husband had left a will in which he donated to her his one-half of the community. This amount was
reduced to the disposable portion, one-third of his one-half, thus
giving the widow a two-thirds interest in the land. After the
mother's death, two of the children sued the other two for partition of the property by licitation, claiming that the four children
owned in equal shares. The defendants produced not only the will
of their father, but also an unprobated will of the mother in which
she left her entire two-thirds interest to the daughter who had
cared for her for many years. The words of her testament showed
her intention to remunerate the daughter for services, which were
proved. The court likened the remunerative donation to a dation
en paiement. Plaintiffs maintained that services of a child are
34. Ibid., citing State ex rel. Hodge v.
(1938).

Grace, 191 La. 15, 184 So. 627

35. 214 La. 383, 389, 37 So.(2d) 844., 346.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 214 La. 377, 37 So. (2d) 842 (1948).
2. 214 La. 733, 38 So. (2d) 507 (1948).
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gratuitous in absence of promise to pay. The court found the
intent to pay in the will wherein the property was bequeathed as
compensation, soi no reduction was due plaintiffs. No mention
of judgment to partition is made, as the pleadings regarding
shares were not in accord with the findings of the court under the
mother's will. The mother's precatory statement in her testament
trusting that the children would not contest it was futile.
Partition was held to be in order in Fabacherv. Fabacher3between the succession of a deceased father and his children who
had been put into possession of their deceased mother's half of
the community subject to the father's usufruct. Article 1135,
Succession of Dumestre4 and Wilson v. Wilson 5 were relied upon.
Robin v. Lob was overruled.
In Succession of Dugas7 the court found that the filing of a
final account by an administrator, wherein a debt by the deceased
to the administrator was shown, was the filing of suit within the
meaning of Act 207 of 1906 as amended by Act 11 of 1926.8 The
case was remanded in order that the testimony of "at least one
credible witness" could be produced to prove the claim as required by the cited statutes. Prescription of ten years under
Article 3544 for board and lodging was applied.
Petitioners sought to have the will of their grandmother probated in Succession of Lewis.9 It was found that the will, dated
May 19, 1882, had been probated in 1899, soon after the death of
the testator and the heirs had been put into possession.
A suit to declare a donation inter vivos null because of fraud
and error fell for lack of proof in Breaux v. Savoie.10
A contest between the state and the natural brothers and
sisters of decedent appears in State v. De Lavallade.11 Decedent's
mother was an unmarried colored woman and his father was alleged to have been an unmarried white man. The mother had
informally acknowledged the child, who was born in 1864. The
court refused to give retroactive effect to Article 204 of the Code
of 1870 providing that those persons who are not legally capable
of marrying at the time of conception ol a child may not there3. 214 La. 940, 39 So. (2d) 426 (1949).

4. 42 La. Ann. 411, 7 So. 624 (1890).
5. 107 La. 139, 31 So. 643 (1902).
6. 204 La. 983, 16 So. (2d) 541 (1944).
7. 215 La. 13, 39 So. (2d) 750 (1949).
8. Dart's Stats, (1939) §§ 2024-2025.
9. 215 La. 79, 39 So. (2d) 830 (1949).
10. 215 La. 88, 39 So. (2d) 833 (1949).
11. 215 La. 123, 39 So. (2d) 845 (1949).
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after acknowledge him. Article 923 was applied and the natural
brothers and sisters and the representatives of those previously
deceased inherited.
Plaintiff attempted in Muse v. Muse 12 to recover from his
sisters and brothers, who had unconditionally accepted their
mother's succession, remuneration for his services to the mother.
The mother was not in necessitous circumstances and had not
promised payment. The court held he must be presumed to have
donated his services and allowed no recovery. The case was carefully distinguished from a situation where one child had performed the legal obligation of caring for a parent! in need when he
would then have a right against the other children for their
contribution.
The facts in Olivier's Minor Children v. Olivier13 were that a
widow, mother of three sons, having lost two of them, had con-,
veyed to the third and only living child a certain piece of property. This was her only asset, and she owned one-half in indivision with usufruct over the other one-half, since the property had
belonged to the community existing between herself and her deceased husband, who had died intestate. The mother had reserved the usufruct in the deed, which recited cash consideration and
credit represented by a note. After the mother's death, minor
children of one of the previously deceased sons attacked, through
their tutrix-mother, the sale of their grandmother as having been
simulated. The vendee son was unable to prove "the reality of
the sale" under Articles 2444, 2480, and the court decreed the
property to form part of the estate of the deceased grandmother
of plaintiffs.
A final accounting of an administrator was reviewed in
Succession of Shaddinger,14 and the judgment appealed from by
the administrator was affirmed. Recitation of the items, the
audit, et cetera, would be of no interest in a resume of this nature.
A protracted discussion of the marital portion appears in
Malone v. Cannon 5 with a resume of jurisprudence. The court
stated that previous expressions of the court that Article 2382
(marital portion) and Article 3252 (providing for a necessitous
widow and children) were to be regarded as in pari materia were
erroneous since these articles do not have the "same purposes,
12.
13.
14.
15.

215 La. 238, 40 So. (2d) 21 (1949).
215 La. 412, 40 So. (2d) 803 (1949).
41 So. (2d) 236 (La. 1949).
41 So. (2d) 837 (La. 1949).
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aim and scope." 16 This analysis is eminently correct in the writer's judgment. The court denied a husband, claiming under
Article 2382, a portion of his deceased wife's estate, since the
spouses had been voluntarily separated for almost ten years. The
case was remanded to the district court to find out why the
spouses had been separated. Furthermore, instructions to the
lower court were that if it were found that the plaintiff was
"free from fault" he must be granted the portion; otherwise, his
suit should be dismissed. Justice McCaleb dissented on the ground
that the majority opinion pursued the spirit rather than the letter
of a clearly written article. This was the basis of previous decisions which, it had been thought, laid to rest the many times
debated question.
While certain individual cases might result in apparent injustices, the social welfare in general might be better served under the dissenting justice's view. In the writer's judgment, an
examination by the court in every case as to whether the spouses
were married "in fact as well as in law," as to how long they had
been separated and why and most particularly as to the matter of
being with or without fault is most deleterious and is an injection
of divorce proceeding material bad enough in its own place. The
parties, during life having seen fit not to subject their personal
affairs to public scrutiny through divorce proceeding, certainly
should not have their differences examined after the death of
one of them. Present ideas of social justice and family privacy
and protection should have more weight than intent of legislature
as discovered by the history of an article pursued from Roman
times, particularly when the language of the article is clear.
The principle that collation cannot take place in a partition7
between co-owners was reiterated in Succession of Scardino.1
Heirs do not become co-owners until they are placed in possession
of the estate by a judgment of court. The property being partitioned in this instance was between co-heirs in settlement of succession, hence collation was ordered. A dispute of fact regarding
retention of a sum by one heir had been resolved by the district
judge, whom the supreme court thought better able to evaluate
veracity of witnesses, et cetera. A withdrawn allegation, which
was a mere conclusion of law and unprejudicial, was said not to
estop plaintiffs in subsequently taking a contrary position.
16. Id. at 845.
17. 215 La. 472, 40 So.(2d)

923 (1949).
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COMMUNITY

PROPERTY

In Lee v. Lee 8 a contract between husband and wife settling
the community was dissolved on account of fraudulent representations made by the husband as to the value of the community.
The agreement was made on the day upon which a judgment for
separation of bed and board was rendered. 19 Emphasis is placed
upon the fact that the parties were not dealing at arm's length due
to the husband's knowledge of the business of the community, and
hence it was not necessary to prove that the wife's reliance on
the husband's representation was the cause of her execution of the
contract.
The settled rule that a community of property is a civil effect
of a putative marriage was applied in Funderburk v. Funderburk,20 and the wife in good faith was awarded her half of the
community upon its dissolution by the death of the husband.
The putative wife also claimed half of the value of the improvements made with community funds upon the separate property
of the husband. The court announced the rule of Article 2408
to be an award of half of the enhanced value of the improved
property, not of the price of the improvements; and, since proof of
an enhanced value was lacking, this item was not allowed. A
claim for certain movables as the wife's separate property was
disallowed as the items were purchased with her earnings while
the community was in existence and hence were community property. A claim was entered for other movables said to have
been manual gifts from the husband. The rule that a husband
may legally make gifts to his wife was honored, but proper proof
was lacking of his intent to make these gifts. The court found
that the objects had merely been purchased as articles for the
home and hence were community property. The discussion regarding the alleged gift of a Buick automobile indicates the necessity for buying in the name of the donee and insuring in like
fashion. Words of presentation are not enough. Real delivery
was not discussed.
A husband bought a moss gin and equipment before marriage.
After marriage he entered into a partnership and a two-thirds
interest in the pre-nuptial investment was transferred to a Moss
Company which issued him seventeen shares of stock. Since the
gin and equipment given for the stock was not the identical gin
18. 214 La. 434, 38 So.(2d) 66 (1948).
19. See Art. 2446, La. Civil Code of 1870.
20. 214 La. 717, 38 So.(2d) 502 (1949).
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and equipment bought before marriage, the court in Hawthorne
v. Hawthorne21 held the shares of stock to be community property.
An accounting from a second wife was demanded by plaintiff, child of the deceased by his first marriage, in Cameron v.
Rowland.22 A careful resum6 of facts occupied the court in distinguishing property of the second community from separate property of the surviving widow. The rehearing is concerned only
with the matter of certain shares of stock in the First Federal
Savings and Loan Association of Shreveport. The court recited
the pertinent passages of the various statutes 28 dealing with
building and loan associations and found the shares purchased
while the 1902 act was in force to be separate property of the
wife, and those purchased under the 1936 statute community
property. Furthermore, the court felt that those statutes making
the shares separate property did not intend to "divest the community" of funds and hence held that the separate estate owed
the community the amounts used in the purchase under the
1902 act.
A married man purch'ased property declaring in the instrument of acquisition that he was single. Plaintiff sought in Humphreys v. Royal24 to recover a one-half interest in this property,
which he had purchased from the divorced wife. The husband
after his divorce had sold all of the property to defendant. The
divorce judgment was never recorded in the parish wherein the
land was situated. The defendant relied on the law of registry
and was upheld by the court, thus divesting the wife of her community interest because of the false representations of the husband. Justice Hawthorne's dissenting opinion strongly presents
the preservation of the community interest to the wife or her
heirs as being a more valuable public policy that that of registry.
He cites Succession of James, 25 which the majority of the court
attempted to distinguish.
Well established rules of community property were reiterated in Williams v. Williams,2 6 namely, that the husband might
preserve title in his separate property by proper recitation in the
deeds of acquisition and that community funds expended on sepa21. 214 La. 905, 39 So.(2d) 338 (1949).
22. 215 La. 177, 40 So.(2d) 1 (1948).
23. La. Act 120 of 1902; La. Acts 140 of 1932, 337 of 1938, 95 of 1940 [Dart's
Stats. (1939,and Supp. 1949) § 716 et seq.].
24. 41 So.(2d) 220 (La. 1949).
25. 147 La. 944, 86 So. 403 (1920).
26. 41 So.(2d) 736 (La. 1949).
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rate property might be recovered by the community from the
separate estate, if an enhanced value by virtue of the expenditure could be shown at the time of dissolution of the community.
MINERAL RIGHTS

Harriet S. Daggett*
2
The case of State v. Evans' has been noted in this journal
and, hence, a discussion of the material would be largely repetitious.
The majority of the court in H. H. TransportationCompany,
Incorporatedv. Owens3 concurred with the finding of the district
judge "that Act No. 68 of 1942 did not contemplate nor did it
require recordation of a vendor's lien covering the sale of an entire drilling rig which is moved into a parish for the drilling of
wells and that it contemplated only the furnishing of supplies
to a well already commenced. ' 4 Act 68 of 1942 reads: "That as to
movable property said vendor's lien and privilege must exist and
be filed for record within seven days after said property, subject
to the vendor's lien and privilege, is delivered to the well or
wells." 5 Justice McCaleb did not subscribe to this view, finding
the section "clear and unambiguous" and the majority interpretation narrow, in that it failed to include the site within the words
"well or wells" and hence took the position that an entire rig
delivered before a well was commenced was not covered by Section 2-B of the statute. Justice McCaleb's view seems the sounder one under the language of the statute, the intendment of the
legislature and the statutory history and trend in connection with
this and other legislation dealing with protection of laborers and
materialmen.
Ownership of royalty interests was involved in Continental
Oil Company v. Fuselier.6 The record owner had made a contract
under the terms of which he transferred his interest to another
person and himself as trustees for a corporation subsequently
to be formed. One of the provisions of the agreement was that
in case the corporation was not formed within ten years, the
trustees would cancel the contract. Since the condition was not

Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

214 La. 472, 38 So.(2d) 140 (1948).
Note (1949) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIW 561.
214 La. 985, 39 So.(2d) 441 (1949).
214 La. 985, 991, 39 So.(2d) 441, 443 (1949).
La. Act 68 of 1942 [Dart's Stat's. (Supp. 1949) §
214 La. 1009, 39 So.(2d) 596 (1949).
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